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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20040324-CA

v.
JOSEPH DELEE ATENCIO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of burglary, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), in the First Judicial District
Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte directing a verdict of
acquittal after the jury convicted defendant of burglary and acquitted him of theft?
Standard of Review: This claim was not preserved below and is therefore
reviewed for plain error. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).

Issue 2: Was it objectively unreasonable for defendant's trial counsel not to move
for a directed verdict after the jury convicted him of burglary and acquitted him of theft
and, if so, was defendant prejudiced?
Standard of Review: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the
first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,11 13,
55 P.3d 1131.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes relevant to this appeal include Utah's burglary statute:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); and Utah's theft statute:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was arrested on July 30, 2002, and charged by information with
burglary of a building and theft. R. 1-5.
On February 19, 2004, following a one-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of
burglary, but acquitted of theft. R. 186.
2

On March 30, 2004, defendant was given a suspended sentence of zero-to-five
years in the Utah State Prison and ordered to serve 90 days in the Box Elder County Jail.
He was also placed on 36 months probation and ordered to pay a $950 fine. R. 209-11;
213-16.
On April 21, 2004, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 217.
On May 17, 2004, two days after defendant was released early from jail due to
overcrowding, he violated his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine. R.
220-21. Defendant was ordered into custody until a hearing could be scheduled. R. 224.
On June 7, 2004, defendant admitted to the probation violation and reimposed the
remainder of defendant's jail sentence and 36 months of probation. R. 235, 238-89.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 12, 1992, Detective Larry Johnston of the Box Elder County Sheriffs
Department was summoned to International Mill Services ("IMS") in Plymouth, Utah, to
investigate a burglary. R. 253:63. Upon arrival, he found the office clerk's desk had
been broken into and a "cash box" containing an estimated $150 had been taken. R.
253:53, 63. The burglar had broken a window with a broom handle to gain entry. R.
253:63.
The burglar left two clues: a single fingerprint discovered on the top drawer of the
desk, R. 253:76, and a footprint found beneath the broken window on top of a computer
tower. R. 253:71, 75. While the fingerprint was being evaluated, Detective Johnston
attempted to discover the brand of shoe that likely made the shoeprint. R. 253:68. He
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searched through catalogues and visited shoe stores until he finally determined that the
print was a work boot. R. 253:69. He then checked the soles of the boots of IMS
employees, but did not find a match. R. 253:77.
But when the fingerprint came back matching the defendant, all the pieces of the
puzzle fell into place for investigators. R. 253:78. Detective Johnston obtained a warrant
to search defendant's residence and retrieved a work boot, the sole of which matched the
footprint taken from the computer tower. R. 253:74.
Defendant had worked as a mechanic at IMS from July 2000 to August 2001 when
he was fired for being absent without calling in sick. R. 253:54, 105. In apparent
retaliation, defendant filed a complaint with a government agency alleging safety
violations against IMS. R. 253:107. During the eleven months following his termination,
defendant had worked steadily for only 11 days and spent the rest of the time doing "odd
jobs" such as hauling junk. R. 253:108.
At trial, defendant denied he was the burglar. R. 253:109. He pointed out,
through direct testimony and cross-examination, that he sometimes worked in the office
that was broken into and that he often retrieved pens and notebooks from the desk where
the cash was kept, which would explain the presence of his fingerprint. R. 253:106. He
also pointed out that the fingerprint was found on the top drawer of the desk, even though
the cash box was taken from the bottom drawer, which showed no fingerprints. R.
253:76-77. Additionally, he noted that although the sole of his boot "best" matched the
shoeprint, there was nothing unique about his boot or the print. R. 253:74-75. Finally, he
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seemed to claim that he was not the person who filed the safety complaint, although he
acknowledged that he had been blamed for it. R. 253:107.
However, the State presented evidence from a fingerprint expert that it was
virtually impossible for the fingerprint to survive the eleven months between the time
defendant was fired and the break-in. R. 253:87. The IMS office clerk also testified that
she cleaned the desk weekly with a cleanser, which the fingerprint expert said would have
eliminated any existing prints. R. 253:56, 87-88.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court did not err in not sua sponte entering a directed verdict
when the jury convicted defendant of burglary and acquitted him of theft. First, an
inconsistent verdict is not grounds for reversal. Second, the verdict is not inconsistent.
Finally, to the extent that defendant is claiming insufficient evidence, he has not
marshaled the evidence and, in any event, the evidence was sufficient to support
defendant's conviction.
Point II: Because the verdict was not inconsistent, defendant's trial counsel was
not ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict. Nor was defendant prejudiced.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT
ENTERING A DIRECTED VERDICT.

Defendant claims the trial court should have sua sponte entered a directed
verdict of acquittal on all charges after the jury convicted him of burglary, but
acquitted him of theft. "The inconsistency of these verdicts is glaringly obvious.
5

Under Utah law[,] a burglary requires both an unauthorized entering together with an
intent to commit theft or other crime." Aplt. Br. at 24. Although this is a correct
statement of the law, defendant's claim is without merit.
As a preliminary matter, defendant faces enormous procedural hurdles in making this
claim because it is, as defendant acknowledges, unpreserved. Claims not raised before the
trial court generally may not be raised on appeal. State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,318 (Utah
1998). Nonetheless, defendant urges this court to consider his claim under the plain error
doctrine. Unpreserved claims may still be considered on appeal if a defendant can
demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994). To demonstrate
plain error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently,
our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
As shown below, defendant cannot meet this burden.
A,

Inconsistency in the Verdicts If Any, Does Not Require Reversal.

Defendant claims his conviction should be reversed because a verdict convicting
him of burglary and acquitting him of theft is inconsistent. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 19-25. In
essence, defendant is claming that the inconsistency necessarily means that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of burglary. However, the numerous courts—including the
United States and Utah supreme courts—have long recognized that an inconsistent
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verdict does not require reversal. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1984);
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah
1986) (per curiam).
In Dunn, the Supreme Court was asked to decide a case in which the defendant,
charged with three interrelated crimes equally supported by the evidence, argued that his
conviction by jury for one of those crimes had to be vacated where the same jury
acquitted him of the other two. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393 (1932). The Supreme Court
rejected the claim, stating:
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either
in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the
defendant's guilty. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their
assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which
they were disposed through lenity.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court concluded, "That the
verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is
possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." Id. at
394.
In Powell, the Supreme Court considered whether the same rule applied where the
jury convicted the defendant of one crime that incorporated commission of another and
the jury acquitted defendant of the incorporated crime. Powell, 469 U.S. at 60-61. In that
case, the defendant was charged with multiple drug crimes, including (1) conspiring to
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute; (2) possessing a specific quantity of cocaine
with intent to distribute; and (3) using a telephone to commit the other two crimes. Id. at
7

60. The jury acquitted the defendant of the first two crimes but convicted her of the third.
Id. On appeal, Powell "argued that the verdicts were inconsistent, and that she therefore
was entitled to reversal of the telephone facilitation convictions." Id. The circuit court
agreed with Powell, holding that "the jury's acquittals on the predicate offenses required a
finding of insufficient evidence on the compound offenses." Id. at 62 n.6. The Supreme
Court, applying Dunn, reversed:
[Inconsistent verdicts—even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense
while convicting on the compound offense—should not necessarily be
interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It
is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its
conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake,
compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser
offense. But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes
to correct the jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or
otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy
Clause....
.. . The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with
the Government's inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent
verdicts should not be reviewable.
Id. at 65-66.
The Court also rejected "a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge
inconsistent verdicts on the ground that in their case the verdict was not the product of
lenity, but of some error that worked against them." Id. at 66. "Such an individualized
assessment would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the
jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake." Id.
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed defendant's claim "that an acquittal on a
predicate offense necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a compound felony
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count." Id. at 68. The Court explained that such an argument "simply misunderstands the
nature of the inconsistent verdict problem":
Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an argument
that the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally estop the
Government on the compound offense, the argument necessarily assumes
that the acquittal on the predicate offense was proper—the one the jury
'really meant.' This, of course, is not necessarily correct; all we know is
that the verdicts are inconsistent. The Government could just as easily—
and erroneously—argue that since the jury convicted on the compound
offense the evidence on the predicate offense must have been sufficient.
Thus, the Court warned:
[RJeview of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and
appellate courts . .. should not be confused with the problems caused by
inconsistent verdicts. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves
assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could
support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt....
This review should be independent of the jury's determination that
evidence on another count was insufficient.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the principles of Dunn and
Powell applied in Utah. See State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). In
Stewart, two co-defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their
convictions based on the jury's acquittal of two other co-defendants of the crime where
the evidence of the latters' guilt was strong. Id. at 611. In rejecting the defendants'
claim, the court concluded that their argument was "premised upon the erroneous
assumption that the acquittals resulted from a determination by the jury that the evidence
was necessarily insufficient to find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Stewart, 729 P.2d
at 614 (emphasis added). "Such a view is purely speculative," the court held, because
9

"[a] jury's acquittal of a defendant, whether tried separately or jointly with others, may
also result from some compromise, mistake, or lenity on the jury's part." Id. "'But
verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.'" Id. at 612 (quoting
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932)).
The court repeated Powell's warning that review of a case for sufficiency of the
evidence
'should not be confused with the problems caused by inconsistent verdicts.
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of
whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational
determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt... . This review should
be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count
was insufficient.'
Id. at 613 (on rehearing) (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 67); see also State v. Hancock, 874
P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App. 1994) ("In Utah, 'it is generally accepted that the inconsistency
of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts aside.'") (quoting Stewart,
729P.2dat613).
In this case, defendant assumes that the jury could not simultaneously acquit him
of theft and convict him of burglary. Under Stewart, that is an "erroneous assumption."
Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614. In fact, the jury could have acquitted defendant of theft by
mistake or for reasons of lenity and still convicted him of burglary based on that same
evidence. See id.; Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-69; Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393-94. Defendant does
not recognize this possibility. Thus, he fails to marshal any of the evidence supporting his
conviction and, thus, is precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 12, 108 P.3d 710 ("We have repeatedly warned of the
10

risks assumed by an appellant who fails to marshal evidence because '[w]hen an appellant
fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound to
assume the record supports the trial court's factual findings'") (citing Justice Michael J.
Wilkins et al., Utah Appellate Practice, 2000 Utah L.Rev. 1115 128 (2000) (additional
citation omitted)). Defendant therefore neither shows that the evidence was insufficient
to support the jury's verdict or that "the sufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f
17,10 P.3d 346.
In support of his claim that the verdicts are inconsistent, defendant cites State v.
Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1994). Although on point, this case actually
undercuts defendant's claim. Hancock was convicted of aggravated sexual assault along
with a co-defendant, Gressman. The jury acquitted Gressman of a separate charge of rape.
Hancock claimed these verdicts were inconsistent because the sexual assault consisted of the
alleged rape; thus, according to Hancock, if there was no rape, there could be no sexual
assault. This Court had no difficulty disposing of this argument:
Aggravated sexual assault encompasses a broader scope of criminal conduct
than rape, and it includes attempted criminal conduct. In other words, rape is
not a predicate felony for aggravated sexual assault because the two crimes
require proof of different elements. Hancock's conviction for aggravated
sexual assault is conditioned neither on his being convicted for rape or
attempted rape, nor on Gressman being convicted of rape or attempted rape.
Id
Similarly, here, defendant seems to want to argue that if there was no theft, then
there could be no burglary. This is incorrect. Theft is not a predicate felony for burglary
11

"because the two crimes require proof of different elements." Id. Thus, the jury's verdict
convicting defendant of burglary, but acquitting him of theft was perfectly consistent.
B.

The Verdict was not Inconsistent.

Defendant's claim also fails because there is no inconsistency in the verdict. In
Utah, the elements of burglary of a building are: (1) entering or remaining unlawfully in a
building or any portion thereof; and (2) an intent to commit theft or any other felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(l)(b) (West 2004). Thus, defendant's claim that the verdict
is inconsistent fails because burglary need not involve actual theft; rather burglary may be
committed by entering or remaining unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit theft. Moreover, according to the Utah Supreme Court,
"[b]urglarious intent 'is a mental state of the actor. [T]he trier of fact must resort to
reasonable inferences based upon [an] examination of the surrounding circumstances to
reasonably infer its existence.'" State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (citing
Farno v. State, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1974)). Under Utah law, intent to steal may be
fairly inferred from unlawful entry. "Where the breaking and entering are clearly
established and not controverted, the intent to steal may be sufficiently established by
inference fairly deducible from all the circumstances and need not be established by direct
proof." Id}
At trial, jurors were presented essentially two items of evidence implicating

1

Additionally, under the statute, the intended crime need not be theft. Jurors were
instructed to find defendant guilty of burglary if they determined that he broke into IMS
with the intent to commit theft or any other felony. See R. 168 (burglary instruction).
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defendant: The fingerprint on the desk and the shoeprint on top of the computer near the
broken window. R. 71-76. Jurors knew that defendant had previously worked at IMS and
that he would have had legitimate reasons to be at the desk and leave fingerprints. They also
knew that the fingerprint was found on the top drawer of the desk, even though the cash box
was taken from the bottom drawer, which showed no fingerprints. R. 253:76-77. Thus,
jurors may well have had reasonable doubt about whether defendant aobtain[ed] or
exercise[d] unauthorized control" over the cash box and, accordingly, whether he had
committed theft. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (theft). The burglary count,
on the other hand, was supported by the fact that the soles of defendant's boots were
consistent with the shoeprint found on the computer directly beneath the window that had
been broken by the burglar to gain entry. R. 253:71, 74-75. No testimony explained why
defendant's shoeprint would be on the computer beneath the window if he were innocent.
Based on this evidence, jurors may have found that defendant entered the building with the
intent to commit theft or some other felony, but found the evidence insufficient to
demonstrate that he had succeeded.
II.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE
FOR NOT MOVING FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not "mov[ing] for a directed
verdict after the State failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant committed
the alleged acts [burglary] beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 16. This claim is
meritless.
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"In determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied effective assistance
of counsel, this court adheres to the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 .. . (1984)." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 23, 84 P.3d 1183. The familiar test
requires a defendant to demonstrate "(1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the [proceedings] would
have been different." Id. (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, «| 19, 61 P.3d 978)
(additional quotations and citations omitted)).
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate his
trial counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Id.; accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert, denied, 115
S. Ct. 431 (1994); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). To establish that
such serious errors occurred, a defendant must identify counsel's specific acts or
omissions that 'fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" State
v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). "Proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,
1162 (Utah App. 1998).
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The court will not second-guess counsels' legitimate strategic choices, regardless
of how flawed those choices might appear in retrospect. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Defendant must therefore overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's
performance fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id; see
also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993), and State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91
(Utah 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
Furthermore, it is not enough to show that counsel's performance could have been
better. The Sixth Amendment entitles defendant "only to effective assistance of counsel,
not to a right to the best or most complete representation available." State v. Tyler, 850
P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see also Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999)
(the court may find counsel's performance constitutionally deficient only if petitioner
establishes that counsel's performance was "completely unreasonable, not merely
wrong").
In order to satisfy the second, or prejudice prong of the Strickland standard,
defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced by any alleged unreasonableness.
To meet this criterion, defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. The courts have defined a
reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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To succeed in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet
both prongs of the Strickland test. Defendant meets neither prong. Trial counsel's
performance did not fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness" because, as
demonstrated in section I., above, there was no basis for entering a directed verdict.
Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at % 23. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for not making a futile
objection. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34, 989 P.2d 52. And because the objection
would have been futile, there is not a "reasonable probability that the outcome of the
[proceedings] would have been different." Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 23. Accordingly,
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this affirm
defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of June 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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